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Dombalagian: Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws

PROPRIETARY TRADING:
OF SCOURGES, SCAPEGOATS, AND SCOFFLAWS
Onnig H. Dombalagian*

Perhaps it is just the lure of alliteration, but one cannot help but hear
echoes of the Volstead Act1 in the Volcker Rule.2 The excesses and
perceived calamitous consequences of public drunkenness in the early
twentieth century were viewed with such opprobrium that critics
persuaded legislators that only outright prohibition, rather than
responsive regulation, could cure social decay.3 The United States
quickly became a “nation of scofflaws,”4 however, as activity migrated
from regulated manufacturers, distributors and dealers to clandestine
facilities, and well-placed dealers (and their legislative and regulatory
lackeys) found ways to skirt enforcement.5 The consequences of such
unregulated activity—both to the health of consumers and public
safety—became so apparent that repeal was the only option.6 A wellmeaning, but short-sighted, experiment ended with little to show but the
shame of hypocrisy and the scars of lost productivity.7
Prohibition aptly captures the tension between the expressive
significance of the Volcker Rule (the Rule) and the impracticability of
its implementation.8 The highly profitable, yet risky trading activity of
* George Denègre Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I would like to thank Professor
Barbara Black and the University of Cincinnati Corporate Law Center for the invitation to participate in
the Center’s 25th Annual Symposium, as well as my fellow contributors, presenters, and participants for
their thoughtful and helpful comments. I would also like to thank Matthew Amoss for his outstanding
research assistance in connection with this project. All errors are mine.
1. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) [hereinafter Volstead
Act], repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
2. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111–203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1620 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2010)). Throughout this
Article, I will refer to Section 619 of the Dodd–Frank Act as the “Volcker Rule” or the “Rule.”
3. See generally EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA
(Arcade Publ’g, 1996).
4. See Prohibition: A Film by Ken Burns and Lynn Novick (PBS 2011), available at
http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/prohibition/. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word
“scofflaw” was the winning entry in a contest to create a word to characterize the “lawless drinker” of
illegally made or illegally obtained liquor.
Scofflaw, THE BIG APPLE (Dec. 28, 2004),
http://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/scofflaw/.
5. See DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 17–19 (Kent State Univ. Press, 2d
ed. 2000).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; BEHR, supra note 3, at 221, 234–36.
7. See Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day, July 14, 1939 (“Little by little it dawned upon me that this
law was not making people drink any less, but it was making hypocrites and law breakers of a great
number
of
people.”)
(syndicated
column),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/eleanor-my-day/.
8. The Rule provides for coordinated rulemaking and enforcement by the following federal
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commercial and investment banking groups represented the moral
failures of the financial community, if not the root cause of the crisis.9
Proprietary trading by banks and their affiliates ostensibly flouted the
moral hazard created by the federal guarantee of fiscal assistance for the
benefit of firms “too big” or “too interconnected to fail.”10 Moreover,
the conflicting interests entailed in proprietary trading created a risk that
financial services providers might profit at the expense of clients and
counterparties who put faith in their advice and discretion.11
The Volcker Rule was designed to strike a compromise between
reestablishing the firewall between investment and commercial banking
activities under the Glass–Steagall Act and retaining the synergistic
benefits of bundling such services championed by the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act.12 In sum, the rule prohibits federally insured banks and all
of their affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading, except when
performing certain socially valuable, “client-oriented” services13—such
as underwriting, market making, securitization, government securities
dealing, and asset management—but only to the extent that such
activities do not pose material conflicts, result in exposure to high-risk
assets or trading strategies, pose a threat to safety and soundness, or

financial regulators: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (FRB or the Board), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, and
collectively, the Agencies). 12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(i) (2010).
9. GRP. OF 30, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 24–26 (2009),
available at http://www.group30.org/rpt_03.shtml; Darrell Duffie, Market Making Under the Proposed
Volcker Rule 25 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 106, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990472; Charles K. Whitehead, The Volcker Rule and Evolving Financial
Markets 41 n.10 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-19, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856633; FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION
REPORT
65–66
(2011)
[hereinafter
FCIC
REPORT],
available
at
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu.
10. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8–9 (2010).
11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING: REGULATORS
WILL NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH NEW
RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED 10–13 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Proprietary Trading Study].
12. See David Weidner, The Innocents of 1933; Today’s Financial Overhaul Only Underscores
ST .
J.,
(Aug.
5,
2010),
the
Impact
of
Depression-Era
Laws,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704017904575409334043400658.html.
13. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and
Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 538-39
(2011). Trading activity may be considered “socially valuable” to the extent that it has positive
spillover effects, such as improving the allocative efficiency of capital markets and the informational
efficiency of trading markets. See, e.g., Letter from Paul A. Volcker to the Dep’t of the Treasury et al.,
Attachment at 1, 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID:
OCC-2011-0014-0209); see also CHAIRPERSON OF THE FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY OF
THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 (2011).
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otherwise threaten the financial stability of the United States. However
clear the spirit of the Rule, the mechanics were left for regulators to
devise, and commentators both supportive of and opposed to the policy
behind the Rule have voiced their concerns in the course of its
implementation.14
Given the open-ended nature of the Rule and the considerable nuance
of the first iteration of proposed rulemaking,15 the punditocracy cannot
agree whether the Rule is a “bloated and weak” monstrosity that is “as
good as dead,”16 or whether it restores the “old dividing line” as if it
were Glass–Steagall reincarnated.17 Even as some regulators have
hinted at additional rounds of rulemaking,18 the financial services
industry appears to be taking the Rule quite seriously. Several banking
groups have publicly discussed the possibility of closing down or
spinning off their investment banking operations,19 whereas others have
moved their trading desks into asset management divisions.20
Meanwhile, some prominent traders at commercial banking groups have
abandoned their posts to go “in house” or to start up private funds.21
Such moves could herald a new, more opaque marketplace, as markets

14. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer:” The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform 22–24 (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1925431.
15. See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68846, 68849 (Nov. 7, 2011)
[hereinafter Joint Proposing Release] (notice of proposed rulemaking under Section 619 of the Dodd–
Frank Act); see also Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Covered Funds, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (Feb. 14, 2012). The CFTC
published a separate proposing release, in which it adopted the commentary of the Proposing Release in
full and made only agency-specific changes to the text of the published rule. Id. at 8332.
16. Jesse Eisinger, The Volcker Rule, Made Bloated and Weak, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 22,
2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/the-volcker-rule-made-bloated-and-weak/.
17. Steven M. Davidoff, Under Volcker, Old Dividing Line in Banks May Return, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Feb. 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/under-volcker-old-dividing-linein-banks-may-return/.
18. Compare Sarah N. Lynch, US SEC’s Paredes Calls for New Volcker Rule Draft, REUTERS
(Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/24/sec-volcker-idUSL2E8DO9SS20120224,
with Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, Progress Is Seen in Advancing a Final Volcker Rule, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (May 2, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/progress-is-seen-in-advancing-afinal-volcker-rule (suggesting that implementation is “on track for completion sooner than some bankers
had expected”).
19. See, e.g., Michael J. Moore, Morgan Stanley Said to Consider Commodities Unit Sale,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-06/morgan-stanley-saidto-consider-commodities-unit-sale.html; Dawn Kopecki & Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, JPMorgan Said to
End Proprietary Trading to Meet Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-31/jpmorgan-is-said-to-shut-proprietary-trading-to-complywith-volcker-rule.html.
20. Tommy Wilkes, Banks Move High Risk Traders Ahead of U.S. Rule, REUTERS (Apr. 3,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-volckerrule-trading-idUSBRE8320GS20120403.
21. See Halah Touryalai, Volcker Rule Refugees, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2012/03/21/volcker-rule-refugees/.
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become more dependent on lightly regulated trading systems or other
market speakeasies where hedge funds and professional traders provide
liquidity outside the direct oversight of regulators.
This Article will approach the topic from the perspective of regulators
who must grapple with the Volcker Rule’s implementation. On the one
hand, the financial community can be expected squarely to resist any
aggressive attempt to implement the Rule—perhaps in the expectation
of a shift in executive and legislative policy—or at least to ensure there
are enough loopholes to permit some proprietary trading to flourish.22
On the other hand, failure to adopt a set of rules and an associated
supervisory, compliance, and enforcement program would almost surely
result in regulators taking significant heat if the Rule does not at least
have some impact on the configuration of Wall Street’s activities or the
internal organization of financial conglomerates, particularly if another
crisis were to follow.23 Moreover, such efforts must be implemented in
a manner that complements (without itself exacerbating the
consequences of) other initiatives mandated by Dodd–Frank, many of
which themselves may cramp the profitability of banking organizations
and other nonbank financial companies.24
The regulators have, on the recommendation of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council,25 staked out a three-pronged approach: (1)
formalizing the classification of trading activities on the basis of existing
account structures, (2) adopting quantitative measures for monitoring
anomalous trading activity, and (3) mandating a system of internal
controls that provides a roadmap for regulatory compliance, supervision,
and enforcement.26 The Proposed Rulemaking leaves considerable

22. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Gillian Tett, Goldman President Warns on Bank Rules, FIN.
TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9753506-2990-11e0-bb9b00144feab49a.html#axzz1yUbVmM9q.
23. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Jeff Merkley and Sen. Carl Levin to the Agencies 1 (May 17,
2012) [hereinafter Merkley & Levin Letter], available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0427) (“The massive failed bet by JPMorgan Chase provides a stark
reminder why we desperately need your agencies to implement the Volcker Rule—a modern Glass–
Steagall firewall that separates our core banking system from high-risk, hedge fund-style proprietary
trading.”).
24. Throughout this Article, “banking organizations” refers to entities organized as bank holding
companies (BHCs) or financial holding companies (FHCs) under the Bank Holding Company Act
(BHCA) by virtue of their affiliation with a FDIC-insured depository institution. See Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2011). Likewise, “nonbank financial companies” (NFCs)
refers to investment banks, insurance companies, private funds, and other companies predominantly
engaged in financial activities that are not BHCs or FHCs. Cf. Dodd–Frank Act § 102(a)(4) (defining
“nonbank financial company”).
25. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS ON
PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS
31–32 (2011) [hereinafter FSOC Study].
26. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68849.
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ambiguity for regulators—and thus discretion for firms—in determining
when activity constitutes proprietary trading and what the consequences
of such trading will be. For example, quantitative measures of risk,
revenue, revenue relative to risk, and customer-facing activity could
either result in excessive restrictions on activity or little to no restriction
at all, depending upon how much discretion regulators retain (or require
compliance personnel to exercise). Moreover, as discussed below,
fragmented jurisdiction over banking affiliates and differing regulatory
attitudes and supervisory resources create a palpable risk of unequal
enforcement.
Part I of this Article considers the arguments made for and against the
limitation or regulation of proprietary trading, with a particular (if not
exclusive) focus on banking entities and other financial intermediaries.
Part II describes the structure of the Volcker Rule, while Part III
concentrates on its implementation by the federal banking and financial
regulators, and the questions raised by commenters (and by the
regulators themselves) on the effectiveness of the proposed rules. Part
IV offers some concluding remarks on how regulators might advance
the moral imperative of the Rule by reorienting the proposed rules to
complement other areas of Dodd–Frank rulemaking.
I. PROPRIETARY TRADING: SCOURGE OR SCAPEGOAT?
How one defends the prohibition against proprietary trading
necessarily depends on how one defines the term.27 The Dodd–Frank
definition (discussed in Part II below) generally focuses on the buying
and selling activity of a “banking entity” that is “engaging as a
principal” for its “trading account” in a range of financial instruments.28
The structure of the Rule provides more guidance as to the specific
kinds of activity Congress sought to address. For example, the Rule’s
definition of a “trading account” focuses on “short-term price
movement” and “near term” purchases and sales, rather than long-term
appreciation in the value of a financial instrument.29 The Rule’s safe
27. The Eighteenth Amendment, after all, may have survived to this day had the Volstead Act
not defined “intoxicating liquors” so aggressively. Volstead Act, supra note 1, at 307–08 (defining the
term to include “any beverage containing one-half of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume”).
28. Some commentators have used broader definitions—such as “the purchase or sale of a
financial instrument with the intent to profit from the difference between the purchase price and sale
price”—though such definitions do not necessarily reflect the distinction between “trading accounts”
and other accounts for regulatory purposes. Duffie, supra note 9, at 2.
29. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2010) (definition of “trading account”). The Joint Proposing
Release suggests that a “near term” trading horizon for purposes of classifying trading activities under
guidance provided under relevant accounting standards is “generally measured in hours and days rather
than months or years.” Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68859 n.102 (quoting FASB ASC
Master Glossary definition of “trading”).
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harbors for underwriting, market making, and securitization likewise
appear to contemplate a distinction between activity that facilitates
trading by clients, customers, and counterparties (for which the firm is
presumably compensated in spreads, commissions, or other fees) and
activity in which the entity shares in profits with (or seeks to profit from
trading against) clients, customers, and counterparties.30
The Rule reflects growing concern about the importance of
proprietary trading within banking organizations and the risks posed by
such activity.31 The gradual rise in proprietary trading as a source of
revenues and risk for investment and commercial banks reflects a
variety of factors. Competition among public bank holding companies
and the transformation of investment banks from partnerships to public
holding company structures has put the financial services industry at the
mercy of shareholders (including executives and traders receiving equity
compensation) fixated on short-term quarterly performance.32 The
profitability of traditional commercial and investment banking activity
has declined as a result of deregulation and heightened competition.33 In
addition, the last decade’s subprime lending boom (and bust) fed the
growth of the market for credit default swaps and other derivatives34 and
the proliferation of highly leveraged structured products, many of which
were marketed to hedge funds,35 which themselves in some cases were
sponsored, capitalized, or financed through prime brokerage
arrangements by investment or commercial banks.36
A causal relationship between such proprietary trading and the
financial crisis is more difficult to establish, although it is easier to

30. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (safe harbor for “underwriting or market-making-related
activities”).
31. See Merkley & Levin, supra note 13, at 520–22; FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 35, 49, 65–
66.
32. See, e.g., ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING:
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW 236–38, 276–80 (2007).
33. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 227
(hypothesizing that the banking industry’s “stability and low-risk profitability have largely vanished
since the mid-1970s” on account of these trends).
34. FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 38–51, 190–95.
35. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, HEDGE FUND SURVEY, charts 7–8, available at
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu/resource/staff-data-projects/hedge-fund-survey
(illustrating
increased
holding of equity positions in residential mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations
from Dec. 2005 to Dec. 2007).
36. See, e.g., Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding
Companies: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 53–54
(2010) (statement of Deputy Secretary Neal S. Wolin, Department of the Treasury) (observing that some
investment banks, such as Bear Stearns, were forced to bail out their sponsored hedged funds during the
crisis and thereby imperiled their own capital adequacy).
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assert that proprietary trading exacerbated the impact of the crisis.37 As
discussed below, advocates of dampening, segregating, or restricting
proprietary trading by banking organizations have offered a variety of
justifications, including heightened moral hazard, conflicts of interest, or
destabilization of cash and derivatives markets. Advocates of less
intrusive regulation argue that the root causes of the financial crisis are
either attributable to activities unrelated to the proposed Volcker Rule
prohibition (e.g., loan defaults and securitization) or will have been
adequately addressed by other regulatory efforts—such as leverage and
net capital limitations, and centralized trading, clearance, and reporting
of derivatives transactions. Each of these justifications is discussed in
turn.
A. Exacerbating Moral Hazard
Chief among the criticisms of proprietary trading is that it allows
firms with special access to government assistance to reap profits from
their trading activity while shifting losses in their trading portfolios to
the public. In Chairman Volcker’s words:
Proprietary trading of financial instruments—essentially speculative in
nature—engaged in primarily for the benefit of limited groups of highly
paid employees and of stockholders does not justify the taxpayer subsidy
implicit in routine access to Federal Reserve credit, deposit insurance or
emergency support.38

As promulgated, however, the Rule extends to banking affiliates that
are not expressly entitled to federal assistance. For example, the Rule
applies to any control person of an FDIC-insured depository institution
(such as bank holding companies) and any non-bank affiliate or
subsidiary of an FDIC-insured depository institution (such as a broker–
dealer, swaps entity, insurance company, or other financial services

37. Duffie, supra note 9, at 25 (suggesting that the losses from loan defaults on conventional
banking activities were far greater in magnitude than market making losses, though that crisis “was
nevertheless exacerbated by the proprietary trading losses of some large broker dealers . . . and the
broker–dealer affiliates of Citibank and some foreign banks”); Julian T.S. Chow & Jay Surti, Making
Banks Safer: Can Volcker and Vickers Do It? 14–15 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper 11-236,
2011) (finding a “[p]ositive association . . . between susceptibility to distress and the importance of
trading income as a revenue generated for U.S. and European banks,” but not Asian banks); see also
GAO Proprietary Trading Study, supra note 11, at 24–26 (finding that the six largest bank holding
companies “usually experienced larger revenues and losses from activities other than stand-alone
proprietary trading and investments in hedge and private equity funds” based on the firm’s publicly
reported net income during the period from June 2006 to Dec. 2010).
38. Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, to
the Agencies, Attachment at 1 (Feb. 13, 2012) (emphasis omitted), available at http://regulations.gov
(retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0209).
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provider).39
The Rule does not apply to entities that are not affiliated with a bank,
on the premise that they are not entitled to federal assistance in the event
of material distress. As a result, bank-affiliated financial services
providers may be at a competitive disadvantage to freestanding
investment banks or insurance companies to the extent that the latter
may freely engage in proprietary trading. Congress has addressed this
asymmetry to a certain degree by giving the Federal Reserve Board the
authority to impose “additional capital requirements for and additional
quantitative limits” with regard to proprietary trading by certain
“nonbank financial companies” if the Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) determines that their activities may pose a threat to the
financial stability of the United States.40
To the extent that the moral hazard created by such federal assistance
is a justification for Rule, some critics argue that segregation of
proprietary trading activities into bankruptcy-remote affiliates, rather
than outright prohibitions on proprietary trading by banking affiliates,
would have adequately addressed moral hazard.41 For example, Section
716 of the Dodd–Frank Act (the Lincoln Amendment) contemplates
compartmentalization of certain swaps trading activities into nonbank
affiliates of an insured depository institution as a condition of federal
assistance.42 Other critics of the Rule have observed that Dodd–Frank’s
39. See text accompanying notes 64–66.
40. See supra note 24 (defining “nonbank financial company”). Section 113 of the Dodd–Frank
Act authorized FSOC to require U.S. “nonbank financial companies” to become subject to prudential
standards and supervision by the Federal Reserve Board if the Council determines that “material
financial distress” or “the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix” of its
activities “could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” FSOC has published final
rules and interpretive guidance regarding the administrative process for such determinations. Authority
To Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 1310
(2012).
41. See R. Rex Chatterjee, Dictionaries Fail: The Volcker Rule’s Reliance on Definitions
Renders it Ineffective and a New Solution is Needed to Adequately Regulate Proprietary Trading, 8
BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 33, 61 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1857371. In the UK,
the Independent Commission on Banking (the Vickers Commission) created by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer has recommended a requirement that banks “ring fence” certain retail deposit-taking and
commercial lending activities within a single entity that would be subject to higher capital charges.
INDEP.
COMM’N
ON
BANKING,
FINAL
REPORT
233–37
(2011),
available
at
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 8305 (2012) (codifying the Lincoln Amendment). Banks are permitted to enter
into hedging and other similar risk mitigation activities directly related to the insured depository
institution’s activities—which include interest rate, currency, and related index derivatives to hedge the
bank’s lending and payment systems activities. Id. § 8305(d)(1). Banks are also permitted to engage in
swaps activities related to their traditional role in underwriting U.S. government, agency, and municipal
securities. Id. § 8305(d)(2). Moreover, § 716 permits banks to enter into credit default swaps (e.g., on
individual debt or asset-backed securities, or baskets of or indices based on a group of asset-backed
securities) as long as they are cleared through an SEC-registered clearing agency or CFTC-registered
derivatives clearing organization. Id. § 8305(d)(3).
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alternative approaches to risk regulation, such as heightened capital,
leverage and margin requirements, are more precise in their application
than outright prohibition.43
One might rightly question, however, whether the Treasury or the
Federal Reserve Board could credibly commit to not bail out any
systemically significant affiliate; a recent study suggests that
systemically significant financial institutions continue to enjoy
significant subsidies (up to 80 basis points in funding costs) from such
implicit guarantees, notwithstanding higher capital requirements and
new orderly liquidation regimes adopted in various financial centers.44
Capital charges alone, moreover, would not necessarily serve as a
deterrent to proprietary trading; indeed, higher capital charges could
have the unintended consequence of reducing the level of banking
services provided by banking entities that elect to divert more capital to
proprietary trading.
B. Conflicts of Interest
Another justification for imposing restrictions on proprietary trading
by financial intermediaries generally is that they invariably create
conflicts of interest, whether as a matter of customer protection, investor
confidence, or corporate governance. Principal trades with customers as
part of a firm’s market making or dealing activity—whether purchasing
customer securities or selling securities to customers from inventory—
necessarily put the interests of the firm at odds with those of the
customer.45 A firm with prior knowledge of customer trading interest or
43. See, e.g., Letter from Barry L. Zubrow, Exec. Vice President, JPMorgan Chase & Co., to the
Dep’t of the Treasury et al., at 3 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0277) [hereinafter JPMorgan Chase] (claiming Volcker Rule creates
“intrusive compliance regime” and same purposes achieved through margin requirements, concentration
limits, and risk-based deposit insurance premiums); Letter from David Hirschmann, President and Chief
Executive Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Feb. 5, 2012),
available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-1344) (suggesting
use of pro-growth heightened capital requirements and liquidity standards as alternative to Volcker);
Letter from Scott C. Goebel, Senior Vice President, Fidelity Investments, to the Fin. Stability Oversight
Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-20100001-0066) (criticizing Volcker Rule while noting that “capital, leverage and liquidity requirements, and
short-term debt and concentration limits” are “tools of choice” to regulate banks).
44. Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions 1–5 (Int’l Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 12-128,
2012). Cf. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Japan’s Experience with Deposit Insurance and Failing Banks:
Implications for Financial Regulatory Design?, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 406–07, 430–31 (1999) (arguing
that “[e]mpirical observation . . . discredits the view that a world without deposit insurance is a world of
market discipline for banks” because market participants will assume the existence of implicit deposit
protection).
45. Prohibiting Certain High-Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Companies:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (statement
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trading portfolios might also trade on the basis of such information in a
manner that harms the customer’s interests as well as the interests of
other investors.46 More generally, traders employed by publicly traded
financial institutions are in conflict with their employers’ public
shareholders, to the extent that their compensation does not precisely
mirror the risk and return to the firm created by their activity.47
The nature of the product being marketed may also create conflicts of
interest. Traders who obtain nonpublic information about the financial
condition of a client of one of its banking or underwriting affiliates may
use that information to trade at the expense of other security holders of
the firm.48 In addition, “complex, highly structured, or opaque”
products, such as asset-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations,
or more exotic derivatives, elevate such concern49: to the extent that
such products are often bespoke, do not trade in a liquid market, and are
sensitive to a variety of risks, banks have a considerable informational
advantage over their customers with respect to pricing.50
Cultural changes on Wall Street stand to further exacerbate such
conflicts. The increasing fungibility of trading and other investment
banking skills and the public company structure of many commercial

of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board) (“When the bank itself
is . . . trading for its own account—it will almost inevitably find itself, consciously or inadvertently,
acting at cross purposes to the interests of an unrelated commercial customer of a bank. ‘Inside’ hedge
funds and equity funds with outside partners may generate generous fees for the bank without the test of
market pricing, and those same ‘inside’ funds may be favored over outside competition in placing funds
for clients.”); see also Stanislav Dolgopolov, A Two-Sided Loyalty?: Exploring the Boundaries of
Fiduciary Duties of Market Makers, 12 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 31, 35–46 (2011) (summarizing judicial
decisions analyzing the application of fiduciary law to conduct by exchange specialists and market
makers).
46. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 48.
47. Will Bunting, The Trouble with Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 993, 1028–29 (2011). This risk is addressed, to a certain degree, by rulemaking under
Section 956(a) and (b) of the Dodd–Frank Act, which require disclosure of, and in some cases prohibit,
executive compensation arrangements offered by certain financial institutions that either provide
“excessive compensation, fees, or benefits” or “could lead to material financial loss.” See IncentiveBased Compensation Arrangements, 12 C.F.R. § 42 (2011) (proposed rules).
48. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 49.
49. Id. For example, Goldman Sachs conceded in its well-reported settlement with the SEC that
certain information regarding the composition of the synthetic CDOs in the ABACUS transaction
(namely, the role and interests of Paulson’s hedge fund in selecting the credit-default swaps selected for
inclusion in the CDO) were not properly disclosed to the customers to whom those products were sold.
Brief for Defendant, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229, 2010 WL 2779309 (S.D.N.Y.
July 14, 2010).
50. For example, Dodd–Frank requires dealers and major market participants in swaps and
security-based swaps to disclose any material risks and conflicts of interest and provide daily marks to
counterparties in connection with such transactions in order to address this informational asymmetry.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3) (2012) (business conduct requirements under new Section 15F of the
Securities Exchange Act); 7 U.S.C. § 6s(h)(3) (2012) (business conduct requirements under new Section
4s of the Commodity Exchange Act).
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and investment banking groups has sharply reduced the long-term
alignment of interests between traders and their firms.51 Young bankers
indoctrinated to believe that high reward is coupled with high job
insecurity train their focus on short-term gains, regardless of the longterm consequences for the firm or its clients.52 As one former
investment bank executive observed, such “people who care only about
making money” will not sustain the long term trust of clients:
What are three quick ways to become a leader? a) Execute on the firm’s
“axes,” which is Goldman-speak for persuading your clients to invest in
the stocks or other products that we are trying to get rid of . . . b) “Hunt
Elephants” . . . get your clients—some of whom are sophisticated, and
some of whom aren’t—to trade whatever will bring the biggest profit to
Goldman . . . c) Find yourself sitting in a seat where your job is to trade
any illiquid, opaque product with a three-letter acronym.53

Policymakers, however, have been reluctant to return to a complete
segregation of financial services, in part because U.S. banks would be at
a competitive disadvantage relative to European and Asian “universal
banks,” but also in part on account of the widely held assumption that
the cross-provision of services promises benefits for both financial
services providers and their customers.54 Instead, regulatory policy
continues to focus on regulating conflicts of interest through
informational barriers and business conduct rules, which are enforced
through a combination of internal controls and regulatory oversight.55

51. See MORRISON & WILHELM, supra note 32, at 281 (suggesting that partner tenure has
declined and staff mobility has increased at investment banks as a result of the “codification” of trading
and investment banking skills and the increased transparency of publicly traded investment banks).
52. See KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 285–94 (2009)
(discussing the consequences of the “high reward/high risk” employment structure of Wall Street, both
with respect to serving longer-term client needs and social welfare).
53. Greg Smith, Why I Am Leaving Goldman Sachs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2012, at A27.
54. Stephen Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/05/business/congress-passes-wide-ranging-bill-easing-banklaws.html (quoting among others Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers and Senator Phil Gramm as
supportive of the relaxation of the Glass–Steagall restrictions). But see Kenneth A. Carow et al., SafetyNet Losses from Abandoning Glass–Steagall Restrictions, J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 22–24
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1802007 (finding evidence that the removal of
product line restrictions has resulted in increased bank bargaining power, which can increase customer
funding costs and reduce capital market access, especially vis-à-vis credit-constrained customers);
Vincent DiLorenzo, Cost–Benefit Analysis, Deregulated Markets, and Consumer Benefits: A Study of
the Financial Services Modernization Experience, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 347–374
(2002) (questioning whether the expected benefits of “[e]nhanced competition and efficiency” following
Gramm–Leach–Bliley were realized).
55. FSOC Study, supra note 25, at 50; see, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in
Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 139–41 (2004) (describing the emergence of
information barriers in investment bank regulation); Peter C. Buck & Krista R. Bowen, Intrabank
Conflicts of Interest, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 31 (1999) (same for commercial bank regulation).
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C. Market Destabilizing Activity
A third charge against proprietary trading is that, in excess, it
increases the complexity, opacity, and latent interconnectedness of overthe-counter derivatives markets. Commercial and investment banking
groups dominate trading in over-the-counter derivatives markets, much
of which trading is concentrated in transactions among the largest such
institutions.56 In the absence of markets or clearinghouses to standardize
such instruments and require adequate collateralization, the
accumulation of significant indirect counterparty credit risk with respect
to one or more firms, such as in the case of Lehman and AIG, could
have potentially devastating consequences.57
On a certain level, these justifications relate more to the integrity of
market structure, rather than the stability of the U.S. financial system.
The “flash crash” episode of May 2010, for example, focused concern
on the technological capacity of exchange operators, the adequacy of
SEC and self-regulatory monitoring of exchange and other reported
transactions, and the lack of effective circuit breakers to prevent human
errors or unanticipated algorithmic trading from cascading. Likewise,
Congress sought to address the role of over-the-counter derivatives in
the recent crisis through the creation of mandatory trade execution,
clearing and reporting facilities (Title VII facilities) for certain classes of
non-exchange traded derivatives (swaps and security-based swaps, as
defined in the Act).
To the extent, however, that commercial banks rely on such
derivatives markets for hedging and risk-mitigation in connection with
their banking activities (e.g., through interest, currency, and creditdefault swaps), the interpretation of the safe harbors for such activities
under both the Volcker Rule and the Lincoln Amendment rely to a
significant degree on the efficacy of such regulation. For example, the
Lincoln Amendment requires banks to effect transactions in credit
default swaps through Title VII facilities as a condition of qualifying for
the safe harbor.58 The Volcker Rule, in coordination with the provisions
of Title VII, thus regulates the ability of banks and their affiliates to
outsource risk management to swap counterparties.

56. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29 (2010) (noting that as of Dec. 2008, the top 5 derivatives
dealers in the United States accounted for 96% of outstanding OTC contracts made by the leading bank
holding companies).
57. Id. at 29–35; FCIC REPORT, supra note 9, at 363–64.
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 8305(d)(3) (2012).
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II. STRUCTURE OF THE VOLCKER RULE
The Volcker Rule, as discussed above, was ostensibly designed to
strike a compromise between reestablishing the firewall between
investment and commercial banking activities under the Glass–Steagall
Act, on the one hand, and retaining the synergistic benefits of bundling
such services championed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, on the
other. The Glass–Steagall Act erected a barrier between commercial
banking activities (e.g., deposit-taking and custodial services) and
investment banking activities (which included, among other things,
proprietary trading in connection with underwriting, market making, and
dealing activities).59 Over the next sixty years, a series of orders issued
by federal banking regulators (culminating in the Federal Reserve
Board’s 1998 Citigroup Order)60 and sympathetic judicial decisions
rendered this barrier obsolete.61 The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999
repealed this prohibition and permitted well capitalized and well
managed bank holding companies to affiliate with other financial
services providers, subject to “functional regulation” of each affiliate.62
To a certain degree, the Volcker Rule reflects the Glass–Steagall
philosophy that certain activities should not, for political or practical
reasons, coexist in the same corporate structure. Like Glass–Steagall,
the Rule ostensibly takes the position that bank holding companies must
59. Of the four key provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act, sections 16 and 21 remain in force. 12
U.S.C. § 24 (2012) (“The business of dealing in securities and stock . . . shall be limited to purchasing
and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the account of,
customers, and in no case for its own account, and the association shall not underwrite any issue of
securities or stock.”); 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (2012) (forbidding any company or person in the business
of “issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing . . . stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities,
to engage . . . in the business of receiving deposits”). The two key provisions of the Glass–Steagall Act
relating to the permitted activities and governance of affiliates of U.S. depository institutions, Sections
20 and 32, were repealed by the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 78 (1996).
60. In 1998, the Board issued an order permitting the merger of Citigroup and Travelers Group,
even though Travelers’ insurance underwriting activities and the investment banking activities of its
affiliate Salomon Smith Barney would not have been consistent with the BHCA’s restrictions and
revenue limitations. Order Issued Under Section 3 & 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, FED. RES.
BULL., Nov. 1998, at 985. Prof. Wilmarth notes that the FRB’s approval permitted Citigroup to operate
as a de facto “universal bank” for up to five years without divesting these subsidiaries, and that many
contemporary commentators viewed the transaction as a gamble that Congress would dismantle the
Glass–Steagall prohibitions against such affiliation within that time. Wilmarth, supra note 33, at 221.
61. Wilmarth, supra note 33, 318–20; Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the
Judicial Process: the Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
672, 703–04 (1987).
62. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (repealing
Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1) & (l)(1) (2012)
(providing that a “financial holding company may engage in any activity, and may acquire and retain the
shares of any company engaged in any activity” determined to be “financial in nature or incidental to
such financial activity,” or “complementary to a financial activity,” provided that its depository
institution subsidiaries are “well capitalized” and “well managed”).
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terminate or spin off certain proprietary trading activities, whether
because of the nature of the product being traded or because of the
nature of the activity. The Rule, however, recognizes that a complete
ban would put U.S. banking groups at a competitive disadvantage in the
international marketplace, and therefore permits non-bank subsidiaries
of financial holding companies to continue to engage in certain
enumerated categories of customer-oriented proprietary trading, as
envisioned by Gramm–Leach–Bliley.63
Structurally, the Volcker Rule consists of a general prohibition on
proprietary trading by banking entities (including the acquisition or
retention of an interest in certain funds that engage in proprietary
trading), subject to several safe harbors for permitted activities and
permitted fund investments, which are further qualified by certain
statutory limitations on activities or investments. Each of these
elements is discussed in turn.
A. General Prohibition on Proprietary Trading
The Volcker Rule states that, unless otherwise provided, a “banking
entity” shall “not engage in proprietary trading” or “acquire or retain
any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a
hedge fund or a private equity fund.”64 “Banking entity,” for this
purpose, is defined to include all insured depository institutions and
their subsidiaries and affiliates,65 although the Federal Reserve Board is
empowered to adopt “additional capital requirements for and additional
quantitative limits with regards to” such activity if conducted by SIFIs
subject to FRB supervision.66
More importantly, “proprietary trading” is defined to mean:
[E]ngaging as a principal for the trading account of the [relevant entity] in
any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any
security, any derivative, any contract of sale of a commodity for future
delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any
other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission may, by rule . . . determine.67

A “trading account,” in this context, refers to “any account used for
acquiring or taking positions in [such securities and instruments] for the
63. See Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-112, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338; 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k)(1) & (l)(1).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)(A) and (B) (2010).
65. Id. § 1851(h)(1).
66. Id. § 1851(a)(2).
67. Id. § 1851(h)(4).
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purpose of selling in the near term (or otherwise with the intent to resell
in order to profit from short-term price movements), and any such other
accounts” so designated by the relevant regulators.68
B. Permitted Activities
Despite the breadth of the statutory prohibition, the Volcker Rule
enumerates several “permitted activities” in which banking entities may
engage, subject to certain statutory limitations as well as any limitations
or restrictions imposed by the relevant federal financial regulator.
Permitted activities include several of the activities national and state
member banks were permitted to engage in under Glass–Steagall, such
as brokerage activities and dealing in government, agency and municipal
securities.69 “Risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with and
related to individual and aggregated positions, contracts, or holdings”
(such as the use of interest rate and currency swaps in connection with
banking activities) also qualify for an exemption, although the Rule
requires that such activities be “designed to reduce the specific risks to
the banking entity” with respect to “such positions, contracts, or other
holdings.”70 Moreover, securitization—itself one of the most risky
activities identified during the recent financial crisis—remains a
permitted activity under Dodd–Frank.
The Volcker Rule also contains exceptions designed for affiliates of
financial holding companies (FHCs) subject to functional regulation by
other federal or state regulators.71 For example, regulated insurance
companies may trade in securities and other instruments “in compliance
with, and subject to” state insurance law.72 Likewise, bank-affiliated
brokers and dealers are permitted to engage in “underwriting or marketmaking-related activities” as SEC- or CFTC-registered intermediaries,

68. Id. § 1851(h)(6). The bank regulators have separately been charged with carrying out a study
on bank investment activities. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 620, 124 Stat. 1376, 1631.
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A) and (D). Proprietary trading and other restricted activity
conducted outside of the United States by foreign qualified banking organizations and certain other
predominantly foreign banking organizations under BHCA §§ 4(c)(9) and (13) is also entitled to a safe
harbor from the Rule. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(H) and (I).
70. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(C).
71. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (defining a “financial holding company” to mean any bank holding
company that meets the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) and is therefore generally permitted to
engage in any activity that is “financial in nature,” “incidental to such financial activity,” or
“complementary to a financial activity” pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)).
72. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(F)(i). This authority is qualified by the proviso that the activity in question
has not been determined by the appropriate federal banking agencies to be “insufficient to protect the
safety and soundness of the banking entity, or of the financial stability of the United States.” Id.
§ 1851(d)(1)(F)(ii).
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as long as their activities are not “designed . . . to exceed the reasonably
expected near term demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”73
While the regulators have the authority to preserve “[s]uch other activity
as [they determine] . . . would promote and protect the safety and
soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United
States,”74 regulators are understandably loath to assert such authority to
expand specific safe harbors (at least in the first iteration of rulemaking).
C. Sponsorship of Private Funds
In addition to prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities
themselves, the Act also provides that banking entities shall not “acquire
or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or
sponsor a hedge fund or private equity fund.”75 Banking entities may
organize, offer, and manage a private fund for their customers in
connection with bona fide trust, fiduciary, or investment advisory
services provided that the entity does not (and discloses to its customers
that it does not) guarantee, assume, or insure the fund’s obligations.76
Investments may also be made to provide funds with “sufficient initial
equity . . . to permit the fund to attract unaffiliated investors,” provided
that the entity “shall actively seek unaffiliated investors to reduce or
dilute the investment” and reduce its investment to a de minimis
amount.77
D. Statutory Limitations
The Volcker Rule qualifies all of the above activities with certain
statutory limitations—or rather, restatements of the articulated policy
reasons motivating the Rule—which federal financial regulators must
implement through rulemaking. The first such limitation permits
regulators to restrict any transaction, class of transactions, or activity
that would “involve or result in a material conflict of
interest . . . between the banking entity and its clients, customers, or
counterparties.”78 The statutory language is sufficiently ambiguous to
73. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(B).
74. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(J).
75. Id. § 1851(a)(1)(B).
76. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(G). Moreover, a banking entity may offer prime brokerage services to funds
in which it has such an investment, notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the Rule on relationships
between banking entities and such funds analogous to those under § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, as
long as the banking entity is certified to be in compliance with the Act’s restrictions. Id. § 1851(f)(1)–
(3).
77. Id. § 1851(d)(4).
78. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(i).
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permit regulators to intervene in situations not only where a conflict of
interest imperils the financial condition of a banking entity, but also
where the transaction might put clients, customers, and counterparties of
the banking entity at risk.
The second and third statutory limitations permit regulators to restrict
any transaction, class of transactions, or activity that would “result,
directly or indirectly, in a material exposure by the banking entity to
high-risk assets or high-risk trading strategies” or “pose a threat to the
safety and soundness of such banking entity.”79 For example, regulators
could prohibit certain forms of algorithmic trading, even if conducted in
accordance with the market making or brokerage safe harbors or in
permitted instruments. The final statutory limitation parallels the
mandate of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the Federal
Reserve Board to identify and restrict activity that would “pose a threat
to the financial stability of the United States,” 80 regardless of the impact
of such activity on the firm.
III. DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION
However clear the spirit of the Rule may be, its language is
frustratingly vague; accordingly, much depends on both the
resourcefulness and fidelity of the federal financial regulators to carry
out its purposes. The comments received on the proposed rules suggest
that the battle between the “wets” and the “dries” has only begun. The
wets, dumbfounded by the federal financial regulators’ inability to
appreciate the important contribution of bank proprietary trading to the
liquidity of financial markets, have roundly criticized the proposed rules
(which, in many cases, merely track the statute itself) as exceeding
Congressional intent.81 The dries, postulating that a return to the status
quo thirty years ago should not be that difficult to achieve, have urged
federal financial regulators to tighten the rules even more.82
While a comprehensive discussion of the rulemaking is impossible, it
may be useful to focus on particular aspects of the proposed rulemaking
79. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(ii)–(iii).
80. Id. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(iv).
81. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase, supra note 43; Letter from Simon Greenshields, Global Co-Head
of Commodities, Morgan Stanley, to the Agencies, Attachment No. 2, 8, 12–13 (Feb. 13, 2012),
available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0304).
82. See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Dir., U.S. Pub. Interest
Research Grp., to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council (Nov. 5, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov
(retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-1346); Letter from Americans for Financial Reform to
the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. et. al. (Feb.13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov
(retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0308); Letter from Occupy the SEC to the Fed. Reserve
Bd. et al. (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-20110014-0221).
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that have drawn the most industry and academic attention. In the
following subparts, I consider in turn (1) the difficulty of defining the
scope of key terms under the Rule, (2) the difficulty of devising
quantitative metrics that capture the spirit of the Rule, and (3) the
difficulty of administering the supervisory, enforcement, and
compliance structure contemplated by the Rule and the proposed
rulemaking.
A. Defining Permitted Activities Qualitatively
As discussed above, the Volcker Rule prohibits any banking entity
from engaging as a principal for its “trading account” in any transaction
involving certain enumerated financial instruments unless such activity
falls within one of the permitted activities under the Rule. Industry
commenters have requested that the financial regulators interpret them
in the manner that preserves the status quo as much as possible—for
example, by viewing the safe harbors as “guidelines” or principles to be
enforced through ongoing supervision rather than “hard coded” rules,
noncompliance with which can trigger regulatory action.83
The difficulty faced by regulators, however, is that any rulemaking
under the safe harbors will necessary entail qualitative distinctions based
on the intent of the trading entity. It is conceivable that regulators could
rely entirely on quantitative metrics to detect activity that exceeds the
safe harbors, but such an ex post application of a qualitative standard
could shift the enforcement burden significantly to regulators and thus
allow the safe harbors to swallow the Rule.84 Moreover, as discussed
below, some types of trading activity—such as “market-making-related
activities or “risk-mitigating hedging activities”—are susceptible to a
wide range of interpretation. To the extent that such statutory terms or
concepts are hardwired into other parts of the federal financial
regulatory scheme, any effort to reinterpret them expansively in the
context of the Volcker Rule could be viewed as an unwanted precedent.

83. See, e.g., Letter from Randolph C. Snook, Executive Vice President, Sec. Ind. and Fin.
Markets Ass’n (SIFMA), to the Fin. Stability Oversight Council 11–12 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at
http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-2010-0002-0909). Prof. Cunningham
describes the complications inherent in implementing or enforcing a “principles-only system” of
regulations. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based
Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1433
(2007) (stating principles-based regulation alone without specific implementing rules is “vulnerable to
abuse”).
84. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
621–24 (1992) (contrasting the ex ante costs of developing rules with the ex post costs of applying and
enforcing standards).
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1. “Trading Account”
Proprietary trading, as discussed above, is specifically defined by
reference to the term “trading account,” which the Rule defines as “any
account used for acquiring or taking positions” in certain covered
financial instruments “principally for the purpose of selling in the near
term (or otherwise with the intent to resell in order to profit from shortterm price movements).”85 Banks subject to the market risk capital rule
must already book “trading assets” into a “trading account” for purposes
of calculating the market-risk-related capital charge.86 To avoid evasion
of this requirement (as well as to address trading assets held at affiliates
not subject to Board regulation), the regulators have expanded the
definition of “trading account” to include accounts that meet the
purpose-driven test articulated in the statute as well as any account used
by an SEC- or CFTC-registered dealer in connection with the activities
requiring such registration.87
Some commenters have recommended decoupling the definition of
“trading account” from specific accounts used for purposes of
computing capital charges.88 In their view, the cost–benefit analysis for
allocation of trades into the “trading accounts” contemplated by the
market risk capital rule is significantly different than the Volcker Rule.89
For example, the Rule could result in lower capital charges if firms
move assets currently held in a trading account for prudential reasons to
nontrading accounts in order to avoid the Rule’s restrictions. Similarly,
federal financial regulators might come under pressure to keep capital
charges for trading accounts low: if banking organizations move
problematic trades out of their existing nontrading accounts to avoid
triggering the rebuttable presumption, the positions they hold in trading
accounts could increase significantly.
More controversially, the agencies have adopted a “rebuttable
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(6) (2010).
86. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, at GL-77 to GL -78 (2007)
(defining “Trading Account”), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y9C20110630_i.pdf.
87. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68945 (proposed joint rule § ___.3(b)(2)(i)(C)). A
dealer may, of course, be required to register with any of the federal financial regulators depending on
the nature of the instruments in which it deals (e.g., corporate debt and equity securities, government
securities, municipal securities, swaps, security-based swaps).
88. See, e.g., Letter from SIFMA-ABA-Fin. Servs. Roundtable & the Clearing House to the
Agencies, at A-16 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID:
OCC-2011-0014-0174) [hereinafter SIFMA-ABA]; Letter from Juliana S. O’Reilly, Vice President &
Chief Bank Regulatory Counsel, Am. Express, to the Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 12–14
(Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0136)
[hereinafter American Express].
89. See, e.g., American Express, supra note 88, at 11.
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presumption” that an account (other than a dealer account or bank
trading account) may nevertheless be deemed a “trading account” if
used to acquire or take a covered financial position for less than sixty
days. Some commenters have suggested removing the presumption—
and instead relying solely on the purpose test—and further applying a
“negative presumption” that positions held over sixty days are not
effected for short-term profit.90 Even if such a rebuttable presumption
were deemed procrustean, absent a bright-line rule, firms could easily
reallocate long-term positions to such accounts in order to create doubts
about the “purpose” or “intent” of the activity in an account.91
Regulators will ultimately have to decide whether further account
delineations will result in fairer application of the Rule or simply more
opportunities for evasion by sophisticated banking entities at the
expense of smaller ones. The account-by-account approach is not only
strongly implied by the text of the Rule itself, but also likely imposes the
least administrative cost on banks (and the least administrative burden
on bank supervisors).”92 Any attempt to complicate account structure
will only heighten the temptation to undermine existing accounts to
accommodate trading activity—for example, by abusing suspense
accounts, customer discretionary accounts, and custodial accounts, in
addition to any accounts for investment activities and permitted
proprietary trading accounts.93
2. Market-Making-Related Activities
One of the Rule’s most controversial exemptions is for “underwriting
and market-making-related activities.” The safe harbor permits banking
affiliates to engage in these traditional investment banking activities and
related hedging activities, subject only to the requirement that such
90. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-19 to A-20.
91. Indeed, some supporters of the Rule have balked at the regulators’ proposal categorically to
exclude from the definition of “trading account” both bona fide liquidity management accounts and
accounts used for repurchase agreements and securities loans, to the extent that such short-term
financing transactions can (particularly if inadequately collateralized) result in naked positions that place
banking institutions at significant risk in the event of a counterparty default. See, e.g., Merkley & Levin
Letter, supra note 23, at 11–13.
92. Cf. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the
D.C. Circuit's Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1835 (2012) (“In a
contemporary legal and political climate that is defined by a rising skepticism of government and more
particularly of regulation, the SEC (and for that matter all independent regulatory agencies) must accept
that it cannot support its rulemaking only through generalized, undeveloped assertions of a proposed
rule’s impact on competition, efficiency, and capital formation.”).
93. See generally Jeffry L. Davis et al., Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Cases
Involving Fraudulent Trade Allocation Schemes, 49 BUS. LAW. 591 (1994) (describing the potential
abuses in trade allocation when financial intermediaries trade the same security or commodity for
several accounts during the course of a business day).
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activities are “designed not to exceed the reasonably expected near term
demands of clients, customers, or counterparties.”94 The regulators have
explicated this safe harbor by requiring that the entity hold itself out as a
market maker and be duly registered as such with the relevant
regulator.95
More controversially, the relevant banking entity’s
activities must be “designed to generate revenues primarily from fees,
commissions, bid/ask spreads or other income not attributable” to
appreciation in the value of covered positions or the hedging of such
positions.96 As required by the Rule and discussed in Part C below, the
entity is further required to establish an internal compliance program to
ensure compliance with these requirements.97
Commentators have objected to defining “market-making-related
activities” by reference to risk and revenue (and the more precise
metrics discussed in Part B), largely by arguing that the term refers not
just to traditional market making in publicly traded equity securities
(where market makers post continuous quotes), but also facilitating
customer trading in less liquid instruments such as corporate debt and
over-the-counter derivatives, for which prices are not publicly quoted
but privately negotiated.98 For such transactions, market makers assume
significant proprietary risk both because (1) finding a party willing to
take the opposite side of trade might take a significant period of time
and (2) they are subject to the risk of adverse selection when dealing
with parties who may be better informed as to the value of a security.99
Because the compensation earned for such “capital commitment” varies
with these risks, industry commentators have considered a standard for
market making based on a schedule of fees and commissions or quoted
spreads to be inappropriate.100
The regulators have endorsed this expansive view in the Proposing
Release, although they have not had significant success in distinguishing
market making from dealing in the over-the-counter market. Critical to
the regulators’ position is the view that over-the-counter market making
can be identified as a low-risk, passive, customer-initiated service.101
Supporters of a more restrictive rule have differing interpretations.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(B) (2010).
95. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68946–48 (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(iv)).
96. Id at 68947 (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(v)).
97. Id. (proposed joint rule § ___.4(b)(2)(i)).
98. See, e.g., Letter from Jim Rosenthal, Chief Operating Officer, Morgan Stanley et al., to the
Agencies 21 (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: OCC2011-0014-0304); Duffie, supra note 9, at 4, 10.
99. See Duffie, supra note 9, at 10–11.
100. Id.
101. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68960–63 (commenting on the identification
of permitted market-making-related activities).
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First, much of the customer facilitation that the industry would like to
include in the definition of “market-making-related activities”—
particularly with illiquid, hard-to-value instruments—has the potential to
create the kind of conflicts of interest and market destabilizing activity
that the Volcker Rule is also designed to address.102 Second, those
supporting a more restrictive implementation argue that the Rule does
not call into question the desirability of market making, but merely the
need to rely on banking entities to perform it.103
More importantly, broadening the definition of market maker could
significantly affect the authority of the SEC, CFTC, and FRB in policing
the Securities Exchange Act and the Commodity Exchange Act.
“Market making,” as defined in the Exchange Act,104 refers to a specific
role played by dealers in equity and options markets for which they are
entitled to preferential treatment under federal securities law.105 These
provisions exist in part not only because regulators consider market
making activity to be less risky than proprietary trading,106 but also
because concerns about financial responsibility and conflicts of interest
must yield to the objective of facilitating continuous trading on
organized exchanges.107
While the agencies have been receptive to the idea of broadening the
Rule’s concept of “market making” to encompass all firms that hold
themselves out as regularly providing liquidity to the market,108 those
102. See, e.g., Letter from Joseph E. Stiglitz, Columbia Bus. Sch., to the Fin. Stability Oversight
Council 2 (Nov. 6, 2010), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using document ID: FSOC-20100002-1133).
103. See, e.g., id. at 1–2.
104. Section 3(a)(38) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(38) (2012) (defining “market
maker” to mean “any specialist permitted to act as a dealer, any dealer acting in the capacity of block
positioner, and any dealer who, with respect to a security, holds himself out (by entering quotations in
an inter-dealer communications system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell such security for
his own account on a regular or continuous basis”). 15 U.S.C. § 78(c) (2012). The reference to “block
positioners,” in this definition, could either be construed as a mandate to permit a broader scope of
proprietary trading under the guise of market making or simply reflect the ability to accommodate the
“near term demands” of customers and clients.
105. See, e.g., id. § 78g(c)(3)(B) (exemption from margin requirements for equity securities),
§ 78k(a)(1)(A) (exception from parity, priority, and precedence rules).
106. See, e.g., Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68961 (asserting that a market maker
“typically generates significant revenue relative to the risks that it retains” and accordingly “will
typically demonstrate consistent profitability and low earnings volatility under normal market
conditions”). Market making, of course, is nevertheless not a risk-free activity. See, e.g., MAUREEN
O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY 20–29 (1997) (describing generally the relationship
between a market maker’s or dealer’s risk of failure and the spread it quotes); LARRY HARRIS, TRADING
& EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 401 (2003) (describing generally the
risks and strategies of market makers).
107. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 103-76, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1666, 1678 (publishing
SEC comment that the market making exception in Section 11(a)(1) of the Exchange Act was included
because market making was considered “beneficial to the markets”).
108. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68870–71.
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efforts will necessarily set potentially unhelpful precedents for the
application of that term in other areas. For example, SEC and FINRA
rulemaking with respect to market making in corporate debt has been
sporadic because of the complexity of defining the role of such dealers
in contributing to the liquidity of markets. Moreover, the SEC and
CFTC are still scratching the surface in terms of regulating the market
structure in which other financial instruments trade, and, as I argue
below, can best implement the market making exemption in tandem
with such market structure rules.109
3. Risk-Mitigating Hedging Activities
The implementation of the safe harbor for “risk-mitigating hedging
activities” has also been the subject of considerable attention by
commentators supportive of and opposed to the Volcker Rule
prohibition. The statutory safe harbor is limited to those activities “in
connection with and related to individual or aggregated positions,
contracts, or other holdings” that are “designed to reduce the specific
risks to the banking entity” in connection therewith.110 The focus of the
implementing regulations, and the surrounding commentary, is the
congruity of the relationship between the positions, contracts, or other
holdings arising from the banking entity’s core or permissible activities
and the accompanying hedge.
The proposed regulations, by way of substance, require that a
proposed purchase or sale of a covered financial position hedge or
mitigate one or more specific risks related to individual or aggregated
positions—giving, as examples, risks that are the subject of Basel II
classification, such as market risk, credit or counterparty credit risk, and
currency or foreign exchange risk. Moreover, the proposed purchase or
sale must be “reasonably” (not “tangentially,” but also not “fully”111)
correlated to the risks it is intended to hedge and must not “give rise, at
the inception of the hedge, to significant exposures that were not already
present” and which are not contemporaneously hedged.112 The
109. See infra Part IV.
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2010). The “mini-Volcker Rule” similarly excepts “[h]edging
and other similar risk mitigating activities directly related to [an] insured depository institution’s
activities” from the requirement that the swaps activity of such depository institutions be pushed out to
an FRB-supervised affiliate registered with the SEC or CFTC as a condition of receiving federal
assistance. 15 U.S.C. § 8305(d)(1) (2010).
111. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68875.
112. Id. at 68948. Procedurally, the proposed regulations require that such hedging activities be
conducted in accordance with the written policies, procedures and internal controls of the banking
entity, and that any hedge be continuously monitored and managed to maintain “a reasonable level of
correlation” and mitigate “any significant exposure arising out of the hedge after inception.” Moreover,
the persons responsible for performing such hedging activities may not be rewarded for proprietary risk-
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Proposing Release seeks further comment as to whether the statutory
references to “aggregated” positions, contracts or other holdings provide
sufficient justification for “portfolio hedging” strategies (or create the
potential for abuse of such strategies).113
Critics of the Rule have sought greater flexibility, both with respect to
the variety of hedging strategies permissible and the scope of hedging
permitted. Thus, for example, industry commenters have asked
regulators to reconsider the “correlation” requirement in order to
facilitate “scenario hedging” or “macro hedging,” which may, for
example, address low-probability “tail” events without necessarily
correlating with specific positions in the firm’s portfolio.114 Firms have
also sought clarification as to their flexibility to pursue the most costeffective hedging strategies, including the freedom to hedge positions
across affiliates or to choose from a variety of hedging strategies.115
Advocates of more congruent hedging, by contrast, have pushed back
on the regulators’ proposal to permit dynamic and portfolio hedging on
the assumption that traders may use the weaker correlation permitted by
such methodologies to mask proprietary trading.116 The publicity
surrounding JPMorgan Chase’s recent multibillion dollar losses
following an improperly placed corporate bond hedge has provided
some support to the argument that even firms with the most rigorous risk
management practices can enter into or fail properly to maintain hedges
that rely on hedging aggregated positions or other more abstract hedging
methodologies.117
The structure of the Volcker Rule once again puts regulators into the
awkward position of defining hedging qualitatively and in a manner that
might contradict the scope of exemptions for permitted bona fide
hedging in other contexts.118 In theory, the regulators could rely on
capital or margin computations to measure the effectiveness of proposed

taking under their compensation arrangements. Id. (proposed joint rule § ___.5(b)(2)(v)).
113. Id. at 68877.
114. See, e.g., JP Morgan Chase, supra note 43, at 24–25.
115. See, e.g., id. at 25; SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-91.
116. See Merkley & Levin Letter, supra note 23, at 29; Letter from Better Markets, Inc. to the
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. et al. 18–19 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at http://regulations.gov (retrieved using
document ID: OCC-2011-0014-0254).
117. See, e.g., David Reilly, J.P. Morgan, Hedges and ‘Asymmetric Accounting’, WALL ST. J.
(May
23,
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304065704577422422211831822.html.
118. See, e.g., General Regulations Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 1.3 (2012)
(defining “bona fide hedging transaction” for economic or commercial indices, rates, values, levels or
other measures that are considered an “excluded commodity” under the Commodity Exchange Act); 17
C.F.R. pt. 151, app. B (2012) (providing examples of “bona fide hedging” transactions for purposes of
position limits and position reporting in swaps); 17 C.F.R. § 240.11a1–3(T) (2012) (defining “bona fide
hedge transactions” in certain securities for purposes of parity, priority, and precedence rules).
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transactions in eliminating or reducing risk. A rule that relied solely on
the quantitative impact of a hedge on the risk of a firm’s portfolio,
however, would shift the burden to bank supervisors and regulators to
identify and challenge transactions that result in inappropriate exposure
to risk under the firm’s own risk-management framework.
B. Measuring the Effect of Proprietary Trading
An essential component of the regulatory framework developed by
the federal financial regulators in implementing the Volcker Rule is the
recordkeeping and monthly reporting of certain quantitative
measurements for firms of sufficient size.119 The statistics are required
to be compiled by each trading unit, with the level of detail dependent
on whether the entity is engaged in market-making-related activities or
underwriting, hedging, and other permitted activities.120 Marketmaking-related activities require the most detailed reporting, including
not only measures of risk management and sources of revenue (most of
which are also applicable to other permitted activities), but also
measures of revenue relative to risk and customer-facing activity.121
The purpose of these recordkeeping and reporting obligations, among
other stated goals, is to assist the banking entity and its regulator in
monitoring trading activity, identifying activity warranting further
review, and evaluating compliance with the safe harbors for permitted
activities.122
From the regulators’ perspective, the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements are a double-edged sword. First, the existence of the
statistics themselves will alter the behavior of regulated entities.
Second, once the regulators have information, they have to decide what
to do with it—when investigations should be triggered, how
noncompliance with the Rule will be defined and how the quantitative
measures will factor into those decisions, and what steps the regulator
will take to correct violations. While all of the federal financial
regulators juggle similar metrics in connection with their oversight of
capital adequacy and liquidity, the qualitative aspects of the Volcker
Rule—which turn on externalities to the federal government,
counterparties, and markets, rather than the financial solvency and

119. The requirements are applicable to banking entities and their subsidiaries and affiliates that
(on a consolidated basis) have trading assets and liabilities the gross sum of which is greater than or
equal to $1 billion, with heightened requirements applicable if the gross sum is greater than or equal to
$5 billion. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956–57.
120. Id. at 68957.
121. Id. at 68957–60.
122. Id. at 68956.
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stability of the firm—will make those judgments significantly more
difficult in practice, particularly when the two goals conflict.
1. Revenue Metrics
In addition to daily calculation of certain risk-management statistics
used by firms and financial regulators,123 the federal financial regulators
have requested banking entities to calculate daily by trading unit certain
source-of-revenue measurements.124
For market-making-related
activities, banking entities must further calculate certain measures of
profit volatility (Comprehensive P/L Volatility and Portfolio P/L
Volatility), ratios of profits to volatility, and additional statistics
(number of unprofitable days and skewness and kurtosis of profit and
loss).125 While risk-management practices are part of the firm’s overall
risk-management obligations under existing and enhanced regulation,
the revenue and risk-to-revenue metrics are meant to flag whether
activity is attributable to impermissible proprietary trading, on the
assumption that market-making-related activity is associated with lower
risks and more stable returns.
Firms have certainly questioned these assumptions, particularly with
respect to dealing in illiquid instruments that require sustained capital
commitment and carry greater risk.126
Academic and industry
commenters have also observed that the regulations fail expressly to
take into account the variety of financial instruments and the different
conditions under which they trade.127 One scholar has specifically noted
that the metrics themselves might encourage firms to withdraw from
dealing in such instruments, preferring to “cream skim” easy order flow,
and thus withdrawing liquidity in the market from the instruments that
need it the most.128
The proposed metrics, as the federal financial regulators note, “are
not intended to serve as a dispositive tool for the identification or
permissible or impermissible activities,”129 and firms are required to
consider asset classes in establishing risk factor sensitivities in their riskmanagement policy. But the incentive structure created by such metrics,
123. These include VaR, Stress VaR, VaR Exceedance, certain Risk Factor Sensitivities, and Risk
and Position Limits. Id. at 68957.
124. These include Comprehensive Profit and Loss, Portfolio Profit and Loss, Fee Income and
Expense, Spread Profit and Loss, and Comprehensive Profit and Loss Attribution to specific market and
risk factors. Id. at 68958.
125. Id. at 68957–60.
126. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase, supra note 43, at 13.
127. See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 69–70; see, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-109.
128. Duffie, supra note 9, at 4, 20.
129. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956.
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both within and across firms, should give regulators some pause.
Within firms, the Volcker Rule may create significant incentives to
parcel proprietary trades throughout an organization’s trading units,
based on each unit’s relative capacity to “absorb” additional risk and
volatility.130 Moreover, as banking organizations continually acquire
and absorb other financial institutions, it is inevitable that compliance
personnel will lag in demarcating boundaries of trading units.
Across firms, the Volcker Rule may create incentives for firms
collectively to identify certain “targets” for risk and revenue metrics,
with a view to making it difficult for regulators to identify anomalous
activity at any one firm, or among trading units executing identical or
similar strategies at different firms. Because that collective activity
would be framed as an attempt to achieve compliance with federal
financial regulation, rather than cartelization of the financial sector, it
would be difficult to challenge its legality. That behavior could
significantly increase the cost of financial services to the extent that
competitors such as hedge funds or independent investment banks could
not fill the void.
2. Customer-Facing Metrics
In addition to measures of revenue and revenue volatility, the
proposed rules require firms to record and report certain statistics
relating to the extent to which their trading activity is with and
reasonably expected to meet the near term need of customers. In
addition to statistics relating to the ratio of trades effected with
customers and non-customers,131 banking entities are required to record
and report statistics relating inventory turnover (weighted by risk) and
the aging of inventory and liabilities. Industry commenters have viewed
some of these statistics as misleading, insofar as concepts like
“inventory” may not readily apply to certain financial instruments,132
while academic commenters have further noted that trading across
130. While trading units are intended to be identified based on a common revenue-generating
strategy (and in the case of trading operations, as a single unit), it is not difficult to imagine a market
making desk seeking to place a trade in the account of another unit within the firm or within one of the
firm’s affiliates, with a view to disguising the nature of the risk undertaken.
131. For this purpose, a counterparty is considered to be a “customer” if it is neither a
counterparty on a securities or commodity exchange nor a broker, dealer, swap dealer, market maker or
affiliate thereof. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68960. More generally, however, the
regulators have intimated that the scope of term “customer,” as used in the interpretation of the market
making related activities exception, may vary depending on the asset class of the financial position and
the market in which it trades. For example, in over-the-counter markets, a “customer” might include
any market participant that “makes use” of the services of a market maker, either upon request or in the
context of a continuing relationship. Id.
132. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88, at A-112 to A-113.
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market makers contributes significantly to customer liquidity even when
an individual market maker does not trade directly with a customer.133
Much of the criticism seems focused on the desirability of market
making as a form of financial intermediation, on the assumption that
only banking entities have the means to conduct such activity subject to
effective supervision. An equally pressing concern is whether the
resulting incentive structure creates a heightened risk of conflicts of
interest with customers.
Requiring banking entities to interact
principally with their customers and control inventory as a condition of
the market-making-related activities safe harbor seems like a recipe for
conflicts, if market makers conclude that they must push overpriced
inventory to customers to remain profitable. This could mean not only
squeezing more profits out of customers, but also increasing the risk to
customers of unsuitable products.
C. Difficult to Enforce
Having defined the framework of accounts within which banking
entities must conduct their permissible proprietary trading activity, and
having specified the metrics that banking entities must compile and
report with respect to such activity, the question remains as to how
regulators themselves will supervise banking organizations subject to
the Volcker Rule. Much of the initial burden will fall on the firms
themselves: depending on their size, firms may be required to establish
(1) “written policies and procedures” regarding activities covered by the
Rule, (2) “internal controls” reasonably designed to monitor and identify
potential areas of noncompliance (for example, based on the quantitative
metrics required by the financial regulators), (3) a “management
framework” that presumably escalates potentially noncompliant activity
as necessary for review and appropriate remedial action, (4)
“independent testing” of the compliance program for effectiveness, (5)
training and (6) sufficient recordkeeping to demonstrate compliance.134
Even as that the Rule’s quantitative metrics and the minimum
standards for a firm’s internal controls under Appendix C of the Rule
only target the largest firms (generally speaking, those with $1 billion or
more in gross trading assets plus liabilities),135 affected BHCs could
133. See Whitehead, supra note 9, at 55–56.
134. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68853.
135. Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68957 (application of metrics); id. at 68956
(application of additional standards under appendix C). The additional standards under appendix C also
apply to any firm whose gross trading assets plus liabilities exceed 10% of its total assets, as well as to
any firm that has a relationship with or invests in a covered fund that meets certain thresholds or to any
firm that the relevant federal financial regulator deems appropriate. Id. at 68918 (proposed joint rule
§ ___.20(c)(2)(i)–(iii)).
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have a family of affiliates potentially regulated by each of the five
Agencies. Not only must the regulators therefore figure out how they
will carry out their supervisory and enforcement programs individually,
they must also develop a means to monitor, verify, and take appropriate
enforcement action collectively when possibly prohibited activity takes
place across affiliates.
1. Interface with Regulator
The proposed rules force regulators into a realm where iterative
supervision will displace “rules and standards”—a realm in which some
regulators may not be equipped to thrive. Bank regulators have long
enjoyed significant financial independence from Congress to finance
their supervisory and enforcement activities; by contrast, market
regulators such as the SEC and the CFTC have had to rely on less
generous Congressional appropriations, which are dependent on the
political cycle.136 The danger is that this state of affairs may embolden
firms to take greater liberties with the Rule, particularly with respect to
their SEC/CFTC affiliates, on the assumption that any conduct in which
the nation’s premier banking conglomerates elect to engage cannot be
found to violate the regulations as drafted and enforced.
For example, the SEC’s failure to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns
was not necessarily due to a lack of information or attention to its
program for supervising consolidated supervised entities (CSE), but
rather a lack of regulatory resources.137 The SEC’s Office of the
Inspector General found that SEC staff members responsible for
supervising Bear Stearns were well aware of Bear Stearns’ significant
concentration of risk in mortgage-backed securities,138 its risk
management personnel’s lack of expertise, staffing, and independence
from traders,139 and its failure to comply with “the spirit of Basel II” and

136. Joel Seligman, Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA L. REV.
233, 253–56 (2004) (describing the appropriations process for the SEC and the desirability of selffunding); Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 525
(2000). See also Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REGULATION 253, 270–74 (2007) (noting that the
“costs of banking regulation in the United States are dramatically higher than the costs in any other
jurisdiction” surveyed, whereas in the area of securities regulation, the level of regulatory intensity is
lower than in common law countries such as Australia, the UK, and Canada).
137. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket? Revisiting Investment Bank
Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 796 (2010) (summarizing OIG’s findings with respect to the SEC’s
oversight of Bear Stearns).
138. U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED
ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 17–18 (2009).
139. Id. at 20–23.
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to update its internal models to reflect the risks posed by its business.140
The SEC’s inability to address these problems stemmed from, among
other factors, inadequate staffing,141 the lack of an effective process for
tracking material issues to ensure that they were resolved,142 and a lack
of coordination with other divisions and other regulators.143 While the
CSE program was voluntary, it was at the core of the SEC’s mission—
unlike the prohibitions of the Volcker Rule, which ostensibly protect the
safety and soundness of the broker–dealer’s affiliates.
These problems are compounded by the express sanctions and stated
intentions of the regulators in enforcing the Rule’s prohibition. In
addressing the question of enforcement, the Rule provides only that,
among other available remedies, the appropriate regulatory agency shall,
whenever it has reasonable cause to believe a firm has engaged in an
activity that functions as an evasion of the Rule or a violation of its
restrictions, “order, after due notice and opportunity for hearing, the
banking entity . . . to terminate the activity and, as relevant, dispose of
the investment.”144 The proposed rules, moreover, provide little further
indication as to how the Rule will be enforced.145 If these intimations
are correct, enforcement of the Volcker Rule may well be no more
effective than periodic Prohibition raids, with trading desks routinely
spotting and exploiting trading opportunities, until such activity is
detected, wound down, and then proscribed after the fact in internal
controls.146
2. Coordination Among Regulators
Regulatory arbitrage will be another potential risk. The largest
banking organizations may well locate their proprietary trading activities
in the affiliate least likely to attract regulatory scrutiny, either because of
the size and experience of its supervisory staff or the nature of its
supervisory or compliance inspection program, or reallocate proprietary
trading activities to affiliates supervised by regulators sympathetic to
such activity.147 To further confuse matters, firms may also purport to
engage in risk-mitigating activities across affiliates within a banking
organization. For example, to the extent that the mini-Volcker Rule
140. Id. at 24–33.
141. Id. at 49–50.
142. Id. at 37–38.
143. Id. at 41–44, 51.
144. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(e)(2) (2010).
145. See Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68956 (proposed joint rule § ___.21).
146. See BEHR, supra note 3, at 79–80.
147. For example, regulators sensitive to the profitability of their charges may feel compelled to
allow revenues from proprietary trading to make up for losses incurred in other business lines.
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requires firms to push most of their swaps activity out of insured
depository institutions as a condition to receiving federal assistance,148 it
will be difficult for federal financial regulators to argue that derivatives
activity should be corralled within individual banking entities. As a
result, regulators will need to coordinate their efforts to verify that crossaffiliate transactions are not intended to evade the Volcker Rule.
Some commentators have suggested that the appropriate response to
this problem is for regulators such as the SEC and CFTC to delegate to
the Federal Reserve Board primary responsibility for handling Rule
violations.149 That delegation would be consistent with the pattern of
granting the Federal Reserve Board greater authority to oversee and take
remedial action with respect to the activities of all affiliates of banking
groups, notwithstanding the formal regulation of affiliates by their
“functional” regulators contemplated by Gramm–Leach–Bliley.150
While the regulators have taken some steps in this regard,151 the history
of allocation of rulemaking and enforcement authority among federal
financial regulators does not suggest that regulators will feel
comfortable relinquishing their prerogatives.152
IV. THE VOLCKER RULE’S IMPERATIVE: A “REBALANCING OF
INCENTIVES”153
If the Volcker Rule stands as a moral statement about the failure of
the financial services industry to tame excesses reaped at the expense of
clients, counterparties, and the public interest, what is notably missing
from the proposed rules is any inclination by the regulators to give
meaning to this moral imperative. Although the proposed rulemaking
faithfully adheres to the text of the Rule, there is a danger that the
regulatory regime they have created will evolve in a manner that shifts
148. See supra text accompanying note 108.
149. See, e.g., SIFMA-ABA, supra note 88.
150. See 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (2012) (as amended by Section 604 of Dodd–Frank).
151. See, e.g., Joint Proposing Release, supra note 15, at 68971 (describing 17 C.F.R. § 255.10,
by which the SEC would delegate its rulemaking authority over investment advisers with respect to
restrictions on covered fund activities or investments to the appropriate regulatory authority for the
banking entity with which the investment adviser is affiliated, subject to reservation of enforcement
authority).
152. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States
Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 27–67 (2005) (describing the
difficulties in coordinating rulemaking, supervision, information sharing, and enforcement among the
federal financial regulators); see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 197–206 (2008) (surveying past Executive and Treasury
regulatory reform efforts).
153. Paul Volcker, Chairman, President’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, Keynote Address
at
the
Atlantic’s
Economy
Summit
(Mar.
14,
2012),
available
at
http://atlanticlive.theatlantic.com/AtlanticEconomySummit_PaulVolcker_with_ SteveClemons.pdf.
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the burden of demonstrating noncompliance onto regulators. For
regulators that have the resources and expertise to exercise ongoing
supervision, as well as the discretionary authority over their regulated
entities required to coerce compliance, such a regulatory framework
may be appropriate. For those that lack the resources, political leverage,
and comparative expertise to monitor the activity of the world’s largest
financial institutions, it is feckless, particularly if those agencies have
other regulatory priorities.
A more vexing danger is that the rules will continue to evolve in a
manner that focuses on the literal interpretation of the concepts in the
Rule (e.g., “market making” versus “dealing”). Such a framework for
implementation could become so technical that the largest and best
established financial services providers will exploit the Rule’s
complexity and the uncertainty to secure a competitive advantage. In
such a world, the largest bank holding companies would strengthen their
monopoly on derivatives dealing, because smaller banking groups
without the scale or range of activities to cloak their trading activity in
routine customer businesses are unable to exploit the Rule’s nuances.
Meanwhile, the residual trading activity by hedge funds and private
traders would fail to provide end users of financial products with the
flexibility and efficiency they have come to expect.
For the Rule to have meaning requires identifying its moral
imperative and designing a regulatory framework that weaves the Rule’s
moral imperative into each regulator’s unique brand of regulation. In
my view, the Rule’s moral imperative is to link the ability of the major
financial services providers to reap profits from proprietary trading
activity—particularly when trading with clients—to the value of the
services they demonstrably provide to the marketplace. While a
discussion of this approach is beyond the scope of this Article,154 a Rule
focused on such an imperative might work in connection with market
structure reforms, such as Dodd–Frank’s Title VII regime for swaps and
security-based swaps, to create a competitive market structure that fills
the void created by the restrictions on proprietary trading by banking
organizations, while at the same time providing banking organizations
with a means to justify that their trading activity in such markets
satisfies the requirements of the Rule.
Prohibition came to an end in part through the efforts of reformers
154. More specifically, I have argued elsewhere that regulators will need to (1) create a critical
mass of nonbank financial companies to participate in such markets, (2) create mechanisms for nonbank
financial companies to trade competitively with established banking entities in such markets, and (3)
establish benchmarks for Volcker Rule compliance that are linked to the competitiveness of such
markets. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule 31–39 (Tulane
University School of Law Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 12-15, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2097007.
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who advocated “moderation and restraint” in the use of “intoxicating
liquors.”155 Whether the Volcker Rule will meet the same fate as the
Volstead Act will naturally be decided through the political process. As
the political wheels turn in the background, regulators can either yield to
the call of the industry to allow the safe harbors to swallow the Rule, or
take advantage of the Rule’s mandate to encourage banking entities to
structure financial markets in a manner that may help achieve the social
and political ends for which the Rule was enacted. The approach
outlined above engages the Dodd–Frank Act holistically from the
perspective of achieving the “rebalancing of incentives” intended by the
Rule’s framers.

155. KYVIG, supra note 5, at 122.
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